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[1] Legal scholars and jurists have identified several criteria (e.g., hydrology, climate,
population, and historical water use) to guide equitable allocation of transboundary rivers
among riparian claimants. Are these criteria used in practice, such that a quantitative
pattern emerges from actual water‐sharing agreements regarding factors affecting
allocations? To address this, we study interstate compacts, the principal mechanism for
allocating the waters of transboundary rivers within the United States. We develop a
georeferenced data set and construct variables representing conditions in state‐based
watersheds of 14 rivers at the times of compact ratification. A state’s water allocation share
of a compact serves as the dependent variable, and a set of explanatory variables is derived
from legal and political theories. We estimate allocation shares using both ordinary
least squares (OLS) and bootstrap regressions, and we apply two alternative specifications
of the factors affecting compact allocations, one with and one without political variables.
Estimated coefficients on variables for land area, population, prior water use, riparian
position, and Congressional committee chair are statistically significant in the OLS
regressions. The preferred OLS specification, which includes political variables, provides a
good fit (R2 = 0.84). We also find that OLS and bootstrap regressions have a similar ability
to predict state allocation shares. We discuss how the results could be used as a reference
point in negotiations over new compacts or international river treaties and as a basis to
identify existing compacts with statistical outliers.
Citation: Katz, D. L., and M. R. Moore (2011), Dividing the waters: An empirical analysis of interstate compact allocation of
transboundary rivers, Water Resour. Res., 47, W06513, doi:10.1029/2010WR009736.
1. Introduction
[2] Water in rivers is a classic common pool resource.
Allocation of river water and other shared water resources is
an increasingly important geopolitical issue as populations
grow, lifestyles change, and the planet’s climate changes.
Over 260 of the world’s rivers cross national boundaries,
and over the past 2 centuries, over 450 international water
agreements have been signed in an attempt to manage these
shared resources, including over 100 that dealwith quantitative
allocations of water [Wolf, 1999; Transboundary Freshwater
Dispute Database, http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/
database, accessed 26 January 2010]. In the United States,
states have aggressively contested water resources from
rivers that cross or form state boundaries (“transboundary”
rivers) for over a century. Interstate compacts, negotiated
agreements between or among the competing states, are the
primary mechanism to resolve these conflicts. To date, over
50 water‐related compacts have been negotiated, with over 20
that primarily address issues of water allocation, especially in
the arid West [Sherk, 2000].
[3] International bodies such as the International Law
Association (ILA) and the United Nations have proposed
criteria for consideration in transboundary water allocation
[ILA, 1967; United Nations General Assembly, 1997]. These
criteria include factors such as hydrology, climate, popula-
tion, and historical water use. In response to disputes
between states over rights to transboundary river waters, the
U.S. Supreme Court defined a similar set of factors to
consider when determining interstate water allocations
[State of Nebraska versus State of Wyoming, 1945; Sherk,
2000, 2008]. While both international law and U.S. judi-
cial rulings seek to achieve an equitable allocation of water,
neither proposed any specific weights or numerical formulas
to guide negotiators in applying their respective allocative
criteria. The U.S. Supreme Court, in fact, explicitly refused
to devise a quantitative prescription based on these factors,
stating that each situation should be evaluated on its own
merits such that “the effort always is to secure an equitable
apportionment without quibbling over formulas” [State of
New Jersey versus State of New York, 1931].
[4] While much has been written about criteria for
transboundary water allocation (see section 2), most of the
previous research has involved qualitative, normative
assessment of these criteria. Relatively little work has been
empirical, and even less has analyzed allocative criteria in a
quantitative manner. This study seeks to address this gap in
the literature by providing a positive statistical analysis of
U.S. interstate compacts. We address the question of
whether an allocation formula is implicit in actual compacts
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by evaluating whether or not a quantitative pattern emerges
regarding the factors that affect state‐level water allocations
of rivers.
[5] To undertake this study, we develop a unique geor-
eferenced data set with 33 state‐level observations over 14
interstate river compacts. Data reflect the primary criteria
outlined in international and U.S. legal theory, including
state‐ and compact‐based water allocation shares, land area,
average virgin water supply, precompact water use, average
temperature, population, and income. Variables are con-
structed from the data to represent conditions found in state‐
based watersheds of the rivers at the time of (or near the
time of) compact passage. To address the possible influence
of political factors not included in equitable allocation cri-
teria, we also include variables covering riparian position on
the river, state population, and representation on Congres-
sional committees that dealt with water resource manage-
ment. Two main statistical analyses are undertaken. First,
we estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to
assess the statistical performance of the explanatory vari-
ables as determinants of state‐level water allocations of
interstate rivers. Second, we estimate bootstrap regressions
as a robustness check for the OLS regression results. The
bootstrapping technique accounts for lack of independence
of values both in the dependent variable (water allocation
share) and in some of the explanatory variables, which could
introduce bias in the OLS regressions. By running repeated
regressions using sampling with replacement, the bootstrap
regressions also compensate for limitations in OLS due to
the small number of observations in the data set.
[6] The study of interstate water compacts addresses the
need for research onU.S. water institutions [National Research
Council, 2001]. Specifically, our research on governance of
common pool rivers in a comparative mode across compacts
relates to two of the National Research Council’s recom-
mendations: “understand issues related to the governance of
water where it has common pool and public good attributes”
and “conduct comparative studies of water laws and institu-
tions” [National Research Council, 2001, p. 4]. As such,
the analysis combines priority research and practical policy
relevance.
[7] In terms of practical relevance, this study contributes
to a knowledge base for understanding conflicts on two
types of interstate rivers, those with compacts and those
without compacts. In the western United States, existing
compacts are being strained by population growth and
environmental demands. While interstate water markets may
resolve some of these tensions, legal scholars agree that
compact allocations are likely to be revisited, and revised, to
address contemporary basin‐wide issues [Sax et al., 2000;
Tarlock, 2001; Sherk, 2005; Muys et al., 2007]. Indeed,
precedent exists for compact revision. The Bear River
Compact and Costilla Creek Compact were amended sub-
sequent to their original signing, and Hundley [2009] reports
on a 2007 amendment to the Colorado River Compact when
assessing tensions among signatory states to that compact.
[8] In the eastern United States, water scarcity is emerg-
ing as a problem in formerly water‐rich regions because of
population growth and economic development. To resolve
transboundary water conflicts, these regions will require
better understanding of interstate allocative criteria and
negotiation principles [Abrams, 2002]. Evidence for the
need of such can be seen in the unsuccessful attempts by
states to develop mutually acceptable water allocation
formulas as part of compacts over the Apalachicola‐
Chattahoochee‐Flint and the Alabama‐Coosa‐Tallapoosa
river basins and in the dispute between Maryland and
Virginia over use of the Potomac River, which the U.S.
Supreme Court eventually decided in 2003.
[9] This study also informs the setting of transboundary
international rivers and other shared water resources, where
conflicts continue to arise despite numerous treaties and a
growing body of international water law. (For recent
reviews of transboundary water conflicts, negotiations, and
management, see Wolf [2007], Dinar [2008], and Zawahri
and Gerlak [2009].) In lieu of established norms, factors
other than equitable apportionment criteria, factors such as
regional balance of power, may dominate international
agreements to divide waters [Zeitoun and Warner, 2006;
Dinar, 2009]. The scope of negotiated compact settlements
is narrower in the United States, however, since states retain
the option to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court’s equitable
apportionment process or to a Congressional apportionment
process, rather than the compact process. States do not have
a guarantee of access to such alternative processes; the Court
is not obligated to accept a request for equitable appor-
tionment and, in fact, has expressed its reluctance to do so
[Sherk, 2005], and Congress has intervened in interstate
allocations only on rare occasion. However, this potential
would likely increase if the Supreme Court or Congress
were to determine that one or more negotiating partners was
not negotiating in good faith on the basis of equitable
apportionment criteria.
[10] Because of the potential availability of these two
alternatives to compacts guided by principles of equitable
apportionment, such principles may be adhered to more
closely in compact allocations than in international agree-
ments. Thus, compact‐based water allocation provides an
important model for equitable sharing that may be infor-
mative for negotiations of international transboundary river
negotiations, where alternative mechanisms to determine
allocations are not available, as well. In this regard, our
study provides a positive perspective on the normative
question of equitable interstate water allocation.
[11] This paper continues by developing the institutional
context for transboundary river allocation and describing
related research in section 2. Section 3 describes the data on
interstate water compacts, the variables formed from the
data, and the statistical methods applied in the study. Section 4
reports the results of the statistical analyses. Section 5
draws conclusions and offers potential directions for
future research.
2. Background and Related Research
2.1. Background and Study Rationale
[12] The International Law Association’s Helsinki Rules
on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers prescribes
a list of 11 factors to be considered in any transboundary
water allocation decision [ILA, 1967]. These factors are
geography, hydrology, climate, past utilization, economic
and social needs, populations dependent on waters, com-
parative costs of alternative means of satisfying the eco-
nomic and social needs, availability of other resources,
avoidance of unnecessary waste in utilization, practicability
of compensation to one or more of the cobasin states, and
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the degree to which the needs of a basin state may be sat-
isfied, without causing substantial injury to a cobasin state.
The Helsinki Rules marked the first general attempt to
formalize standard factors to consider for “reasonable and
equitable” water allocation in an international context. The
Helsinki Rules remained a set of broad recommendations,
never achieving the status of an international agreement.
Thus, perhaps not surprisingly, they were never applied
directly to international treaties or other water allocation
decisions [Wolf, 1999]. Their importance, instead, lies in
placing the issue of standard criteria for transboundary water
allocation on the international agenda and in serving as a
basis for subsequent work in this field.
[13] Some 30 years after the Helsinki Rules, the inter-
national community reached broad agreement on princi-
ples for equitable sharing of transboundary waters in the
United Nations’ (UN) Convention on the Law of the Non‐
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, which was
adopted by the UN General Assembly (21 May 1997). This
work was based largely on a consolidated version of the
Helsinki Rules, although it was expanded to include some
factors not considered earlier, such as ecological concerns.
Despite broad endorsement (the 1997 General Assembly vote
on the convention produced 103 in favor, 3 opposed, and
27 abstentions), the convention remains controversial. It has
yet to come into force. As of early 2011, only 21 nations
had ratified, accepted, acceded, or approved the agreement.
[14] One reason that the convention has yet to be widely
adopted and remains controversial is the lack of means to
prioritize between its competing allocation principles and
criteria. Both the Helsinki Rules and the UN convention
were normative in nature, yet both explicitly avoided plac-
ing weights on the factors they identified, leaving that to the
policymakers and negotiators of specific agreements. The
1997 UN convention, for instance, provided the vague
directive that “the weight to be given to each factor is to be
determined by its importance [emphasis added]” and that
“all relevant factors are to be considered together.” The
Berlin Rules on Water Resources, an attempt by the ILA to
update the Helsinki Rules, similarly stated that “the weight
of each factor is to be determined by its importance in
comparison with other relevant factors. In determining what
is reasonable and equitable use, all relevant factors are to be
considered together and a conclusion reached on the basis of
the whole” [ILA, 2004, p. 21].
[15] In the United States, three approaches are available
for resolving water disputes between or among states:
interstate compacts, apportionment by the U.S. Supreme
Court, and apportionment by the U.S. Congress [Sax et al.,
2000]. Compacts have the status of federal law upon rati-
fication of the U.S. Congress. If states cannot agree on a
compact, they can appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court to issue
an equitable apportionment decree that establishes state‐
level allocations. Three such decrees are in force; however,
the Court has indicated a preference for states to resolve
water disputes via compacts [Muys et al., 2007]. As noted in
section 1, although the Court defined criteria for guiding
allocations, U.S. legal doctrine also provides little direction
on how to prioritize among competing factors. The option of
Congressional apportionment flows from the power to reg-
ulate interstate commerce. The U.S. Congress has acted
only twice to apportion rivers. Sherk [2005] highlights the
advantages of Congressional apportionment in light of com-
plications created by federal laws and regulations applicable
to interstate water resources.
[16] In the absence of international institutions to effect
equitable water allocation, factors other than the equitable
apportionment criteria, such as regional balance of power,
may dominate international allocation agreements [e.g.,
Conca et al., 2006; Zeitoun and Warner, 2006; Wolf, 2007].
In the case of U.S. compacts, however, one might expect
recommended factors for equitable apportionment to play a
prominent role in allocations due to the U.S. Supreme Court
serving as a potential arbiter of last resort. Through analysis
of U.S. compact allocations, we thus also seek to provide
insight for the context of international water allocation.
2.2. Related Research
[17] Prior research on allocation of transboundary river
water has been conducted in several academic fields,
including law, economics, political science, geography, and
history. Much of the work on allocative criteria, especially
in the legal field, is normative in nature. Most of the
empirical studies are qualitative case studies. While useful
for hypothesis development, case study approaches, espe-
cially qualitative case studies based on individual basins,
can be of limited value in terms of comparative analysis and
testing of theories [George and Bennett, 2005; Dinar, 2008].
[18] Several authors have summarized legal issues asso-
ciated with interstate water allocation in the United States.
The work by Muys [1971] is the most comprehensive legal
analysis of interstate compacts, and Sherk [2000] presents an
updated study of the same nature. Summary treatments of
the topic are covered in legal texts on U.S. water law [e.g.,
Grant, 1996; Sax et al., 2000; Tarlock, 1991]. Muys et al.
[2007] describe a recent effort by experts to devise an
“ideal” interstate water compact. Mandarano et al. [2008]
present a qualitative comparative analysis of alternative
interstate water management institutions, including com-
pacts. In addition, many historical narratives describe the
development of individual compacts or adjudications; some
of these provide commentary on the motivations of nego-
tiators and their individual priorities and strategies [e.g.,
McCormick, 1994; Hall, 2002; Z. L. McCormick, Oklahoma
State University, The use of interstate compacts to resolve
transboundary water allocation issues, unpublished manu-
script, 1994]. This literature, however, provides little on
which to base comparative assessments.
[19] Several studies use economic theory and reasoning to
examine interstate water allocation. Bennett et al. [2000]
apply economic theory to the analysis of interstate com-
pacts. They derive conditions for the “universally optimal”
compact. Using this as a benchmark, they compare two
commonly used compact allocation methods, fixed quanti-
ties and fixed percentages. Several other studies assess
the economics of interstate water allocation. These studies
take compact‐based state‐level allocations as given with-
out assessing the process that created the allocations. The
majority of these studies use theoretical or empirical models
for three related purposes: to identify optimal allocations,
to demonstrate inefficiencies in current allocation mechan-
isms, and to recommend water markets as a decentralized
mechanism to induce efficiency [e.g., Burness and Quirk,
1979, 1980; Howe, 1985; Booker and Young, 1994]. Howe
et al. [1986] present six criteria for evaluating methods of
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allocation, including flexibility, reliability, and predictabil-
ity. However, these are structural guidelines, not allocative
criteria; that is, they do not represent the factors that legal
experts define as essential for allocating water from trans-
boundary rivers.
[20] A few studies conduct statistical analysis of com-
pacts and compact implementation. Bennett and Howe
[1998] develop a model of compact enforcement and assess
incentives for noncompliance. They conduct a comparative
assessment of the South Platte River and the La Plata River
and find empirical evidence that both the frequency and level
of noncompliance tend to be larger under a fixed allo-
cation rule relative to a percentage allocation rule. Schlager
and Heikkila [2009] compile data from a study of 14 inter-
state river compacts to assess the view of compacts as
rigid, inflexible governance structures that cannot respond
to water conflicts. They find that compact governments
and related water agencies are capable of responding to
conflicts, and they further identify the types of conflict
solutions adopted. Our research differs from these two
studies by focusing on compact formation, not compact
implementation.
[21] In the literature on international water allocation,
our research is most similar to that by Dinar [2008], who
seeks to find general patterns in treaties: what issues are
addressed, how the issues are resolved (in terms of con-
sequences to different nation‐states), and what factors
explain the features of a resolution? Similar to our study,
water allocation is addressed as a treaty issue, and several
explanatory variables are created, such as riparian location on
the watercourse and relative economic output of the nation‐
states. The treaties do not provide enough data to support
regression methods of statistical analysis, so results from
Dinar’s study and our study are not directly comparable.
[22] Other research on international water allocation
consists primarily of historical case studies of individual
river basins or compilations of such studies [Dinar and
Dinar, 2003; Zawahri and Gerlak, 2009]. Few studies,
however, address the role of allocative criteria in any
comprehensive manner. The study by Wolf [1999] is an
exception, giving a broad historical overview of the devel-
opment of international allocative criteria. Wolf’s treatment,
however, does not provide a quantitative analysis of actual
implementation of these criteria. In fact, with the exception
of work on conflict over shared water resources, relatively
little quantitative empirical work exists covering interna-
tional water allocation.
[23] Several studies develop theoretical analyses of pro-
posed normative criteria for international river allocation
[e.g., van der Zaag, 2002]. Like their counterparts for inter-
state rivers in the United States, these studies generally apply
an economic efficiency criterion and stress the importance
of considering the economic value of water in allocation
decisions. Other studies emphasize the potential for water
markets to play a useful role in resolving international water
disputes [e.g., Dinar and Wolf, 1994; Easter et al., 1999;
Perry et al., 1997; World Water Commission, 2000; Fisher
and Huber‐Lee, 2005]. Finally, a few theoretical studies
address general allocation issues from a game theoretic
perspective [e.g., Rogers, 1997; Ambec and Sprumont, 2002;
Just and Netanyahu, 2004; Carraro et al., 2005; Wu and
Whittington, 2006; Eleftheriadou and Mylopoulos, 2008].
Dinar et al. [2007] develop an integrated approach to the
study of conflict over transboundary international water
resources, applying theory from international relations, eco-
nomics, and international law, as well as the quantitative
tools of river basin modeling and game theory.
[24] In terms of empirical assessments of international
transboundary allocations, Hamner and Wolf [1998] present
summary data, although no statistical analysis, of interna-
tional water agreements in the Transboundary Freshwater
Dispute Database. While some allocation characteristics are
mentioned, allocative criteria were not a focus of this study.
Conca et al. [2006, p. 263] conduct a principled content
analysis of international river agreements, seeking to find
out “whether governments are converging on common
principles for governing shared river basins and whether the
effort to create a global normative framework for shared
rivers has shaped the principled content of basin‐level
international accords.” Though this study is a positive sta-
tistical analysis, rather than addressing allocation principles,
it focuses on the extent to which treaties include common
institutional and governance mechanisms, such as provision
for information exchange, prior notification, or dispute
resolution. Drieschova et al. [2008] also undertake a
quantitative analysis of governance mechanisms in interna-
tional river treaties, but they focus on whether or not
agreements contain rigid or flexible allocation mechanisms
and not on the allocative criteria themselves.
[25] Two empirical studies seek to identify factors that
lead to the formation of international water treaties [Espey
and Towfique, 2004; Song and Whittington, 2004]. Both
articles conduct logit analyses of the probability of treaty
formation between countries, using somewhat different
vectors of social and geographic characteristics as explan-
atory variables. Neither article, however, attempts to identify
the factors used to establish treaty‐based water allocations.
[26] In sum, the majority of the literature on trans-
boundary water allocation develops qualitative legal analy-
sis, theoretical economic analysis, or normative policy
analysis. Empirical analyses of interstate water compacts
largely examine compact implementation, not compact for-
mation. Empirical analyses of international river treaties
largely focus on factors leading to the formation of inter-
national agreements, rather than on factors affecting the
division of waters in the treaties.
3. Methodology
3.1. Preliminary Motivation of the Model
[27] This study seeks to understand the factors that affect
state‐based water allocations under interstate compacts. In
order to compare across river basins of different sizes, the
dependent variable, AllocationShare, is a state’s share of the
total water allocated by a compact. We develop a set of
explanatory variables that include many of the normative
criteria for fair allocation, as posited by legal studies and
judicial rulings, as well as some political factors posited by
political and international relations theory. We included
variables representing all legal criteria for which we could
obtain data. Some criteria, e.g., “avoidance of unnecessary
waste in utilization of waters of the basin” or “practicability
of compensation to one or more of the co‐basin States”
(Helsinki Rules), were not included in the analysis. Proxy
variables were utilized for some criteria that were vaguely
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defined, e.g., “climate” and “economic and social needs”
(Helsinki Rules).
[28] We estimate regression equations of the general form
AllocationSharesc ¼ þ Xsc þ usc; ð1Þ
where AllocationSharesc is the share of total water allocated
to state s in compact c, Xsc is a vector of explanatory
variables, a and b are parameters to be estimated, and usc is
an error term. With this simple motivation, we turn to
describing the data and variables.
3.2. Data and Variables
[29] The dependent variable, AllocationSharesc, is a
state’s water allocation share under a compact. Data on
allocations were obtained directly from compact texts. Of
over 20 compacts that address quantitative allocations, we
succeeded in identifying or calculating 33 state shares of
water allocated under 14 compacts. While some compacts
explicitly write allocation in terms of percentage of flows
(e.g., the Colorado Compact and the Belle Fourche Com-
pact), others are less straightforward, indicating fixed
amounts from various tributaries or amounts contingent on
time period, flow conditions, storage levels, and so on (e.g.,
Upper Colorado Compact and the Republican River Com-
pact). In cases in which shares were calculated, they were
done so on the basis of historical average streamflow data
[U.S. Geological Survey, 1995]. The Yellowstone River
Compact provides an illustration. The compact text allo-
cates Montana and Wyoming shares of four tributaries of
the Yellowstone. (As the Yellowstone River Compact does
not allocate water directly to North Dakota, we only eval-
uate the allocation between Montana and Wyoming.) We
took average streamflows for the tributaries at stream gau-
ges for all years prior to (and including) the year of compact
signing, 1950. The shares were multiplied by the stream-
flows to derive tributary allocations to each state. The
tributary allocations were summed to obtain an aggregate
measure of allocations and, finally, allocation shares: 68%
to Montana and 32% to Wyoming.
[30] The 14 compacts included in this study are listed in
Table 1, along with the signatory states and the year of
compact signing. Figure 1 displays a map of the basins
covered by these compacts.
[31] We develop 11 explanatory variables, all of which
are categorized by state and compact and thus carry the sc
subscript. Eight variables represent allocative criteria
defined by U.S. or international legal doctrine. They include
(1) LandSharesc, the share of total land area in a river basin,
among compact signatories, (2) RelativePrecipsc, the relative
precipitation within a basin (a proxy for relative contribution
to natural flow), (3) NonCompactPrecipSharesc, the share of
rainfall outside of a basin (a proxy for available alternative
sources of water in a state), (4) MeanTemperaturesc, the
mean temperature for counties within a basin during the
irrigation season, April–September, (5) PopulationSharesc,
the share of population in counties within a basin, (6)
PopulationGrowthsc, the growth rate of population in
counties within the basin for the 20 year period covering
the decennial census in the decade before and after the
census closest to compact signing (a proxy for anticipated
future needs), (7) RelativeIncomesc, a relative measure of per
capita income in counties within the basin (a proxy for eco-
nomic need and/or economic power), and (8) PriorWater-
Sharesc, a measure of historical water use for irrigation in
counties prior to compact signing.
[32] Political variables may have affected compact allo-
cations even though the compact process is intended to
achieve equitable allocation. For instance, water negotiation
theory stresses the geographical advantage of upstream nations
[e.g., Frey and Naff, 1985;Wolf, 2007; Dinar, 2008] and the
advantage that politically stronger parties may have because
of their ability to impose punitive measures on negotiating
partners via issue linkage in forums outside of water nego-
tiations [e.g., Zeitoun and Warner, 2006; Dinar, 2008,
2009; Daoudy, 2009; Zawahri and Gerlak, 2009]. Riparian
position may also imply specific legal obligations or lim-
itations on usage. For instance, both U.S. and international
law often carry provisions requiring states not to cause
significant harm (e.g., UN Convention on the Law of the
Non‐Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,
Article 7), an obligation that primarily affects upstream or
border riparians. Last, research in U.S. political economy
emphasizes the ability of Congressional committee chairs to
Table 1. Compacts in Data Set
Compact Signatory States Year Signed
Arkansas River Compact Colorado, Kansas 1948
Bear River Compact Idaho, Utah, Wyoming 1958 (amended 1980)
Belle Fourche River Compact South Dakota, Wyoming 1943
Big Blue River Compact Kansas, Nebraska 1971
Caddo Lake Compact Louisiana, Texas 1979
Cheyenne River Compact South Dakota, Wyoming 1950a
Colorado River Compactb Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming 1922
Costilla Creek Compact Colorado, New Mexico 1945 (amended 1963)
La Plata River Compact Colorado, New Mexico 1922
Republican River Compact Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska 1942
Sabine River Compact Louisiana, Texas 1953
Snake River Compact Idaho, Wyoming 1949
Upper Colorado River Compact Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming 1948
Yellowstone River Compact Montana, Wyoming, North Dakotac 1950
aThe Cheyenne River Compact never went into effect. It was included in the study because the original draft was agreed upon by both states but rejected
by Congress because of Native American water rights issues. Subsequent attempts at a compact were unsuccessful.
bThe Colorado River Compact was signed by the seven states indicated but allocated water between the upper and lower basins, rather than by state. For
the purposes of this study, each basin was treated as a unit of analysis.
cThe Yellowstone River Compact does not allocate water directly to North Dakota, and as such, this study only evaluates the allocation between
Montana and Wyoming.
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influence outcomes related to their oversight functions
[Weingast and Moran, 1983]. We therefore include three
additional explanatory variables: (1) RiparianPositionsc, a
binary variable indicating whether the state was the most
upstream state in the compact, (2) StatePopulationsc, the
share of total population of basin states within a compact (a
proxy for political power), and (3) CommitteeChairsc, a
binary variable indicating whether a state had a represen-
tative who chaired a Congressional committee with juris-
diction over interstate river compacts in the Congressional
session during or prior to compact signing.
[33] The raw data for many of the explanatory variables
are county‐level data, for example, county‐level data on
income or population. For the variables based on these data,
counties were included if some part of the county fell within
the river basin boundary. The county‐level data are typically
aggregated on a “river basin” basis within the state, not on
an “entire state” basis. That is, the data are summed over
counties in the river basin within each state. Last, several of
the variables are constructed as a share (percentage), with
the numerator a value for a particular state and the
denominator a summed value over all states in the compact.
In terms of time frame, the data sources represent the time
period at or near the time of compact signing, unless oth-
erwise indicated.
[34] Here we briefly describe the explanatory variables
and underlying data sources. Table 2 provides summary
statistics for the variables. Appendix A provides a complete
description of data sources and methods of variable
construction.
Figure 1. Map of compact basins included in this study.
Table 2. Summary Statistics of Variablesa
Variable Observations Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum
AllocationShare 33 0.424 0.5 0.258 0.005 0.960
LandShare 33 0.424 0.411 0.261 0.046 0.954
RelativePrecipitation 33 0.975 0.989 0.238 0.325 1.566
NonCompactPrecipShare 33 0.424 0.452 0.167 0.114 0.798
MeanTemperature 33 4.191 3.783 1.481 1.760 7.430
PopulationShare 33 0.424 0.404 0.251 0.065 0.917
PopulationGrowth 33 1.299 1.301 0.324 0.659 2.141
RelativeIncome 33 0.991 0.993 0.179 0.536 1.578
PriorWaterShare 33 0.424 0.369 0.347 0.002 0.982
RiparianPosition 33 0.394 0 0.496 0 1
StatePopulationShare 33 0.424 0.352 0.200 0.078 0.772
CommitteeChair 33 0.121 0 0.331 0 1
aThe mean of all share variables equals 0.424, as follows. Shares sum to 1 within a compact, there are 14 compacts, and 14 divided by 33 observations
equals 0.424.
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[35] LandShare is a share variable ranging from 0.01 to
0.99 for each state and summing to 1.00 for each compact.
River basin area was calculated using geographical infor-
mation system (GIS) transects, with data from U.S. Geo-
logical Survey (USGS) watersheds, state boundaries, and
county boundaries data layers.
[36] RelativePrecip is a measure relative to the basin
mean, which is normalized to 1.00. Precipitation data were
obtained from the USGS average annual precipitation data
layer for the years 1961–1990. The data were weighted by
land area when constructing the variable.
[37] NonCompactPrecipShare is a share variable ranging
from 0.01 to 0.99 for each state and summing to 1.00 for
each compact. Precipitation data were obtained from the
USGS average annual precipitation data layer for the years
1961–1990. The data were weighted by land area when
constructing the variable.
[38] MeanTemperature is based on categorical data indi-
cating average temperature ranges on a scale from 1 to 9.
Temperature data were obtained from NOAA’s National
Climatic Data Center (NCDC) climate maps for 1971–2000.
Data for the variable were weighted by land area.
[39] PopulationShare is a share variable ranging from
0.01 to 0.99 for each state and summing to 1.00 for each
compact. County and state population data were obtained
from U.S. Census Bureau data for the census year closest to
the year in which the compact was signed.
[40] PopulationGrowth is given in percent growth
rate divided by 100. Population data sources are as for
PopulationShare.
[41] RelativeIncome is a measure relative to the basin
mean, which is normalized to 1.00. County and state income
data were obtained from U.S. Census Bureau data for the
census year closest to the year in which the compact was
signed. County‐level income data were available only for
the years 1959, 1969, 1979, and so. For compacts ratified
prior to 1959, 1959 income was used because county‐level
income data are not available for earlier years.
[42] PriorWaterShare is a share variable ranging from
0.01 to 0.99 for each state and summing to 1.00 for each
compact. County‐level irrigation data were obtained from
the Census of Agriculture reports (http://www.agcensus.
usda.gov/Publications/Historical_Publications/index.asp)
from the year closest to the year of compact ratification for
which data are available.
[43] RiparianPosition is a binary variable equal to 1 if the
most upstream state in the compact and 0 otherwise.
[44] StatePopulation is a share variable ranging from 0.01
to 0.99 for each state and summing to 1.00 for each com-
pact. Population data sources are described under Popula-
tionShare.
[45] CommitteeChair is a binary variable equal to 1 if the
state had a representative who chaired either the House of
Representatives or the Senate committee with oversight over
interstate river compacts during or immediately prior to the
session in which the compact was signed and is 0 otherwise.
Data on Congressional committee membership were obtained
from Congressional reports [U.S. House of Representatives,
2002; U.S. Senate, 1989].
[46] As noted, proxy variables are used in some cases
because of data limitations. Each state’s relative contribution
to the river’s natural flow is not measured, so the variables
for RelativePrecip and MeanTemperature serve as proxies
for the share of natural flow. The variable PriorWaterShare
uses estimates of irrigation water use as a proxy variable for
total water withdrawals, as the latter data are not available.
This is a reasonable proxy given that irrigation accounted
for the overwhelming majority of overall withdrawals. For
population and income variables, values were for entire
counties, even in cases in which only part of the county fell
within the basin boundary. Use of proxy variables and
imprecise data for some of the explanatory variables is
justified, not only because of data limitations but also
because the research objective is to understand the concerns
and strategies of state negotiators, who would have faced
similar limitations of available data. Thus, the data set
should reasonably approximate the information available to
compact negotiators and decision‐makers.
3.3. Regression Methods
[47] The data set includes 33 observations of state‐based
compact water allocations and related explanatory variables.
Of the 14 compacts, 10 allocate water between two states, 2
allocate among three states, 1 allocates among five states,
and 1 allocates between two groups of states (the Colorado
River Compact allocates between an upper basin group and
a lower basin group) (Table 1).
[48] The states in an individual compact make up a cluster
sample, so standard errors are adjusted for intracompact
correlation. Formally, we estimate a particular version of
equation (1), the cluster‐specific random effects model
[Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 831]:
AllocationSharesc ¼ þ Xsc þ c þ "sc; ð2Þ
where nc is a random component specific to compact c and
"sc is a residual error term. The random component captures
the effect of any within‐compact unobserved variables.
[49] We apply the OLS estimator to estimate two speci-
fications of equation (2), both of which include Alloca-
tionShare as the dependent variable. Specification 1 contains
only the eight variables associated with the legal criteria for
water allocation: LandShare, RelativePrecipitation, Non-
CompactPrecipShare, MeanTemperature, PopulationShare,
PopulationGrowth, RelativeIncome, and PriorWaterShare.
Specification 2 contains all 11 explanatory variables; that is,
to specification 1, it adds RiparianPosition, StatePopula-
tionShare, and CommitteeChair.
[50] We investigated multicollinearity in the regression
estimates by computing variation inflation factors after each
regression. The largest variance inflation factor is less than
5, which is well below the threshold level for harmful
multicollinearity of 10 [Kennedy, 1992, p. 183]. Thus,
multicollinearity is not a problem despite the small number
of observations. To address heteroskedasticity, robust
standard errors clustered by compacts are computed in the
regressions.
[51] To supplement the OLS regressions, we conducted
bootstrap regressions of the same two specifications. Boot-
strapping involves repeated sampling from the observations
with replacement, and various types of bootstrapping tech-
niques are useful for addressing different shortcomings in
data sets, such as small sample size or relative lack of var-
iation in observed variables [e.g., Stine, 1989; Hesterberg
et al., 2006]. In this study, bootstrap regressions were esti-
mated by randomly drawing one observation from each
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compact and running an OLS regression with 14 observa-
tions. The value for each coefficient estimate was saved, and
the regression was repeated with resampling 1000 times.
After 1000 resamples, the distribution of the coefficient es-
timates for each variable approaches a normal distribution.
The standard deviation of the coefficient estimates for a
given variable then serves as a measure comparable to the
standard error in an OLS regression. Confidence intervals,
and therefore a form of statistical significance, can be esti-
mated by eliminating the 1%, 5%, or 10% of observations
at the tails of the distribution and assessing whether the
remaining 99%, 95%, or 90% of the observations are either
all above or all below zero.
[52] The bootstrap regressions serve as a valuable
robustness check for the OLS regression results, which may
have shortcomings for at least three reasons. First, several of
the variables, including the dependent variable, are mea-
sured as shares that sum to 1 within a compact. As such,
observations on a given variable are not independent of one
other. For a two‐party compact, for instance, once the
allocation share of one state is known, the other is neces-
sarily 1 minus this share. Potential problems created by this
type of data are circumvented by sampling only one
observation from each compact for each bootstrap regres-
sion. Second, given that the original data set is small,
bootstrap regressions provide an alternative approach for
evaluating confidence intervals for estimated coefficients
based on a larger number of observations. Third, since the
state is the unit of analysis in the OLS regressions, compacts
with more than two states are overrepresented and thus may
unduly impact study results. By sampling only one obser-
vation per compact, the bootstrapping technique also avoids
giving extra weight to compacts with higher numbers of
parties.
[53] A third regression method, censored least absolute
deviations estimation, was also used to reflect the fact that
the sum of the dependent (and of some of the independent)
variables is constrained to 1. The values did not differ
substantially from the OLS values and are not reported.
4. Results
4.1. OLS Regressions
[54] OLS results are reported in Table 3 for the two
specifications: (1) variables associated with the legal criteria
for water allocation and (2) all variables, including political
variables. Both specifications fit the data relatively well,
with R2 values of 0.79 and 0.84. We conclude that specifi-
cation 2 is the preferred specification for three reasons: its
adjusted R2 is larger (0.75 to 0.70), two of the additional
variables in the specification have estimated coefficients that
are statistically significant, and the joint hypothesis that the
three additional variables in specification 2 are equal to 0 is
strongly rejected (F(3, 13) = 15.58, p = 0.0001). The factors
affecting interstate water allocation thus appear to include
political variables in addition to the physical and socio-
economic variables prescribed by legal authorities and
doctrines.
[55] The variables LandShare, PopulationShare, and
PriorWaterShare are significant in both specifications and
relatively stable in magnitude across specifications. Each of
these variables takes on values between 0 and 1 to reflect the
state’s fraction of a multistate compact total for the
respective variable. The estimated coefficients in specifica-
tion 2 can be interpreted as follows: a 0.01 (1%) change in
LandShare changes a state’s expected water AllocationShare
by 0.00224 (0.224%). A 1% change in PopulationShare
changes a state’s AllocationShare by 0.436%. A 1% change
in PriorWaterShare changes a state’s AllocationShare by
0.394%.
[56] Other variables under the legal criteria, including
precipitation, population, and income measures, do not exert
a statistically significant effect on a state’s water Allo-
cationShare. Population growth rate (PopulationGrowth)
Table 3. Regression Estimates for State Allocation Share of Interstate River Compacta
Independent Variable
OLS Regressions Bootstrap Regressions










LandShare 0.201*** 0.063 0.224** 0.085 0.180 0.151 0.185 0.270
RelativePrecipitation 0.009 0.108 0.121 0.100 −0.083 0.211 0.006 0.268
NonCompactPrecipShare −0.009 0.146 0.278 0.188 −0.010 0.303 0.407 0.721
MeanTemperature 0.003 0.008 −0.011 0.011 0.011 0.045 −0.004 0.063
PopulationShare 0.432** 0.152 0.436*** 0.116 0.491** 0.183 0.481* 0.285
PopulationGrowth 0.129 0.096 0.119 0.070 0.130 0.193 0.110 0.263
RelativeIncome −0.023 0.164 −0.048 0.174 −0.113 0.331 −0.234 0.514
PriorWaterShare 0.353*** 0.081 0.394*** 0.078 0.380*** 0.135 0.447** 0.234
RiparianPosition −0.124*** 0.041 −0.108 0.185
StatePopulationShare −0.356 0.226 −0.458 0.617
CommitteeChair 0.114** 0.040 0.049 0.256
Constant −0.158 0.261 −0.133 0.227 −0.041 0.540 0.117 0.701
R2 0.79 0.84





aThe dependent variable is AllocationShare. For ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, robust standard errors, clustered by compact, are reported. For
bootstrap regressions, coefficients represent mean values from bootstrap regressions, with standard deviations reported. Statistical significance was
assessed using a bootstrap percentile confidence interval method. Legal variables indicates specification 1, and all variables indicates specification 2.
Significance is indicated as follows: ***, significant at the 1% level; **, significant at the 5% level; *, significant at the 10% level.
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approaches significance at the 10% level (11.5%) in
specification 2.
[57] The upstream position on a watercourse is thought to
strengthen a country’s bargaining position in international
water negotiations [e.g., Frey and Naff, 1985; Wolf, 2007;
Dinar, 2008]. Yet the evidence in specification 2 suggests
that the upstream state in interstate compacts (Ripar-
ianPosition = 1) is actually penalized, receiving a lower
water share by 0.124 (12.4%). This may be because
downstream parties often develop rivers earlier; however,
one would expect most of such effects to be captured by the
variables of PriorWaterShare and PopulationShare. They
also may result from the legal requirement not to cause
significant harm to downstream parties. Regardless of the
cause, the results are consistent with findings that other
factors may dominate the theorized upstream advantage
[Daoudy, 2009; Dinar, 2009].
[58] Last, a state’s water share increases by 0.114 (11.4%)
if one of its representatives in the U.S. Senate or House
was chair of a committee with jurisdiction over interstate
river compacts (CommitteeChair = 1). This result pro-
vides quantitative evidence to supplement the historical
research by Hundley [1992, p. 212], who wrote of states
exerting influence over the Colorado River Compact through
“their control of key congressional reclamation [water]
committees.”
[59] Considering a particular state and compact provides a
useful perspective on the results. We consider Montana in
the Yellowstone River Compact with Wyoming, in which
Montana receives a 68% AllocationShare of the compact
water. Montana has 52% of the area (LandShare for Mon-
tana = 0.518), 58% of the population at compact signing
(PopulationShare = 0.576), and 48% of the water use in the
basin at compact signing (PriorWaterUse = 0.478). On the
basis of the estimated coefficients, Montana’s predicted
AllocationShare would increase by 0.224% if its LandShare
increased by 1% to 53%. AllocationShare would increase by
0.436% if Montana’s PopulationShare increased by 1% to
59%. AllocationShare would increase by 0.394% if Mon-
tana’s PriorWaterShare increased by 1% to 49%. In addi-
tion, Montana is the downstream state in the compact, and
Montana did not have a committee chair in the U.S. Con-
gress. These two variables are binary (0, 1) variables. Thus,
Montana’s predicted AllocationShare would decrease by
12.4% if its riparian position were switched relative to
Wyoming. Last, AllocationShare would increase by 11.4%
if one or more of the Congressional water committees were
chaired by a member from Montana.
[60] Bennett and Howe [1998] and Bennett et al. [2000]
emphasize that three types of allocation formulas emerge
from interstate river compacts: percentages of flow, fixed
absolute quantities, or some combination of both. In light of
these studies, we also estimated regressions that included
dummy variables indicating if the compact was based on
percentages of flow, fixed quantities, or a combination. The
results did not differ significantly from the results without
such variables and thus are not reported.
4.2. Bootstrap Regressions
[61] The distribution of estimated coefficients is roughly
normal for most variables in the bootstrap regressions. Given
the normality of the distribution of coefficient estimates,
inferences can be made as to statistical significance on the
basis of coefficient means and distributions, and results can
be compared to those from the OLS regressions. As each
bootstrap regression utilizes only one randomly drawn obser-
vation from each compact (for N = 14), the bootstrap regres-
sions provide a stringent basis of comparison for the OLS
regressions. For each variable, we report the mean and
standard deviation of its estimated coefficients on the basis
of the 1000 regressions (Table 3).
[62] A bootstrap percentile confidence interval method
was used to assess the statistical significance of the boot-
strap coefficient estimates. Confidence intervals are con-
structed in this method by arranging the bootstrap results in
increasing magnitude and using the observations at the
upper and lower a/2 percentiles as a measure of the a sig-
nificance level [Efron and Tibshirani, 1993; Mooney and
Duval, 1993]. Thus, we note when 90%, 95%, or 99% of
the 1000 estimates of a coefficient are greater than 0 for
positive coefficients or less than 0 for negative coefficients.
Only two variables, PopulationShare and PriorWaterShare,
satisfy these criteria at different levels in both specifications
of the bootstrap regressions.
[63] For purposes of illustration, Figure 2 shows histo-
grams of estimates for two variables in specification 2,
LandShare and PriorWaterShare. For LandShare, although
the mean was positive and close to the value found in OLS,
many coefficient estimates were negative, and so one cannot
claim with confidence that the mean is significantly different
from zero. For PriorWaterShare, however, the mean is
similar to that found in OLS, and more than 95% of the
coefficient estimates are above zero, providing solid support
that the coefficient is robust.
[64] The bootstrap regressions provide mixed support for
the OLS results. Across the board, the mean values of the
coefficient estimates from bootstrapping are very similar to
the corresponding OLS coefficient estimates. However, for
three variables, LandShare, RiparianPosition, and Commit-
teeChair, the distributions of coefficient estimates from
bootstrapping raise a question about the statistical signifi-
cance of these variables’ coefficient estimates in the OLS
regressions.
4.3. Predicted State Shares of Interstate Compacts
[65] Predicted compact shares provide additional per-
spective on the OLS and bootstrap regressions. We report
actual shares and predicted shares on the basis of specifi-
cation 2 (Table 4). Predictions based on the OLS results are
straightforward to generate. For the bootstrap, we applied
the equation PredictedSharesc =  + Xsc , where  is
the mean value of the estimated constant and  are the
mean values of the coefficient estimates from the boot-
strap regressions.
[66] The predicted shares are very similar across OLS and
bootstrapping, just like the estimated coefficients are very
similar; the predicted shares are typically closer to each
other, in fact, than they are to the actual shares. On a case‐
by‐case basis, the bootstrap prediction error (measured as
actual share minus predicted share) is smaller in absolute
value than the OLS prediction error in 16 of 33 cases, the
OLS prediction error is smaller in 14 cases, and there are
three ties (when rounded off to hundredths).
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[67] Mean absolute error (MAE), a common measure of
forecast accuracy [Greene, 2008], is the average of the
absolute value of the 33 prediction errors. The MAE is
0.079 for the OLS predictions and 0.083 for the bootstrap
predictions in specification 2. For specification 1, the MAE
is 0.092 for the OLS predictions and 0.094 for the bootstrap
predictions. Thus, OLS outperforms the bootstrap on this
basis, but only by a small margin.
[68] A second relevant concept is normalized predicted
share of a compact. Within a compact, the actual shares are
constrained to sum to 1; that is, the total water endowment
gets allocated via the compact. The predicted shares are not
subject to this constraint, such that predicted shares within a
compact typically sum to greater than 1 or less than 1 and
only rarely sum to 1. The Colorado River Compact provides
an example of the predicted shares summing to greater than
1, while the Yellowstone River Compact illustrates the
opposite case. The normalized predicted shares are adjust-
ments to the predicted shares to assure that shares sum to 1
within a compact.
[69] To derive the normalized predicted shares, we rescaled
shares equiproportionately within a compact while con-
straining their sum to equal 1. The rescaling uses the fac-
tor (1/Ss=1
s ps), where ps is the predicted share of state s
within a particular compact. Predicted shares within a
compact are each multiplied by this factor to derive the
normalized predicted share. For example, if the predicted
shares of a compact summed to 0.9, we multiplied each
individual predicted share by (1/0.9) to obtain the nor-
malized predicted shares. Rescaling by this common factor
assures that the shares sum to 1. Thus, the rescaling is a
contraction if Ss=1
s ps is greater than 1 and an expansion if
it is less than 1. Table 4 reports the normalized predicted
shares for the OLS and bootstrap regressions, again using
specification 2.
Figure 2. Histograms of coefficient estimates from bootstrap regressions.
KATZ AND MOORE: INTERSTATE COMPACT ALLOCATION OF RIVERS W06513W06513
10 of 15
[70] The normalized predicted shares reflect the reality of
allocating the total water endowment. In some cases, but not
in all cases, the normalized predicted shares are closer to the
actual shares than the predicted shares are (Table 4). Using
these normalized shares for specification 2, the MAE is
0.073 for the OLS prediction and 0.078 for the bootstrap
prediction. These are slightly lower and therefore slightly
better as a measure of forecast accuracy than the comparable
measures of MAE with the nonnormalized prediction errors.
4.4. Study Limitations
[71] In interpreting the results, it is important to note
several limitations of this study. Because of limited data, a
few compacts were not covered in the database, and vari-
ables were not included for all possible allocation criteria.
Furthermore, because of the small data set and, thus, the low
number of degrees of freedom in estimating regressions, the
regressions did not include interaction variables, despite the
fact that such interrelationships may be considered in actual
negotiations. Finally, numerous proxy variables are possible
for several of the criteria evaluated, and numerous alterna-
tive methods are available for quantifying each of them.
Given these limitations, this study presents an initial
framework for empirical analysis of the application of water
allocation criteria, one that can be built upon in future
research.
5. Summary and Conclusions
[72] Jurists and legal scholars are loathe to characterize
formulas for equitable water allocation, and thus onemight be
surprised to find a quantitative pattern emerge from interstate
river compacts. Yet OLS regressions indicate that several
variables play a statistically significant role in determining
compact allocations, despite a small database for the analysis.
These variables include three of the legal criteria for equitable
allocation involving land base (LandShare), population base
(PopulationShare), and prior water use (PriorWaterShare).
They also include two political factors involving riparian
position on the watercourse (RiparianPosition) and key
Congressional appointments (CommitteeChair).
[73] Bootstrapping presents an alternative method to OLS
for evaluating the presence or absence of systematic
weighting in compact allocations. This method may produce
more reliable (less biased) results than OLS, given the lack
of independence between different observations and the
small number of observations in the data set. In our study,
two variables, PopulationShare and PriorWaterShare, are
particularly robust, appearing significant in both specifica-
Table 4. Actual Share, Predicted Share, and Normalized Predicted Sharea
Compact State Actual Share
Predicted Share Normalized Predicted Share
OLS Bootstrap OLS Bootstrap
Arkansas Colorado 0.60 0.54 0.58 0.58 0.59
Kansas 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.42 0.41
Bear Idaho 0.23 0.50 0.50 0.44 0.47
Utah 0.24 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.30
Wyoming 0.52 0.29 0.26 0.25 0.23
Belle Fourche South Dakota 0.90 0.89 0.84 0.85 0.85
Wyoming 0.10 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.15
Big Blue Kansas 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.11
Nebraska 0.93 0.78 0.85 0.86 0.89
Caddo Lake Louisiana 0.50 0.53 0.49 0.55 0.50
Texas 0.50 0.43 0.49 0.45 0.50
Cheyenne South Dakota 0.80 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.75
Wyoming 0.20 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.25
Colorado Lower Basin 0.50 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.50
Upper Basin 0.50 0.50 0.54 0.47 0.50
Upper Colorado Arizona <0.01 0.11 0.19 0.10 0.18
Colorado 0.51 0.39 0.32 0.37 0.30
New Mexico 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.16
Utah 0.23 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.27
Wyoming 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.09
Costilla Creek Colorado 0.35 0.30 0.39 0.30 0.37
New Mexico 0.65 0.67 0.65 0.70 0.63
La Plata Colorado 0.50 0.63 0.59 0.54 0.54
New Mexico 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.46 0.46
Republican Colorado 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.12
Kansas 0.40 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.23
Nebraska 0.49 0.57 0.60 0.60 0.65
Sabine Louisiana 0.50 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.34
Texas 0.50 0.63 0.69 0.64 0.66
Snake Idaho 0.96 0.99 1.00 0.94 1.00
Wyoming 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00
Yellowstone Montana 0.68 0.49 0.54 0.57 0.54
Wyoming 0.32 0.36 0.45 0.43 0.46
aThe variable for actual share is AllocationShare. The predicted share entries are derived from specification 2 and are not constrained to equal 1 within a
compact. The normalized predicted share entries are computed by equiproportionately rescaling the predicted shares for a given compact while constraining
them to sum to 1. Both actual shares and predicted shares are rounded off to hundredths.
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tions in both OLS and bootstrap models. The result with
PriorWaterShare is not surprising, as historical use was
specified explicitly in some of the compacts as an allocative
criterion. Muys [1971] notes that several compacts explicitly
specify existing uses as an allocative criterion, and about
half indicate that allocations include federal uses, which can
be significant. Still, the statistical significance of the Prior-
WaterShare coefficient could not be assumed a priori,
especially given that the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly
rejected a strict doctrine of prior appropriation in favor of
equitable apportionment based on a range of criteria [Sherk,
2000]. The variables LandShare, RiparianPosition, and
CommitteeChair, although they were significant using OLS,
are not significant in the bootstrap regressions. These results
are consistent with U.S. Supreme Court rulings, which
have rejected LandShare and RiparianPosition as criteria
for equitable apportionment [Sherk, 2008]. A chair position
on an important Congressional committee, of course, has
never been a recommended criterion. We should note that
while the estimated coefficients on these three variables are
not statistically significant in the bootstrap regressions,
their sign and relative magnitude remained similar to those
in the OLS regressions.
[74] Do the regression estimates provide numerical for-
mulas for the allocation of transboundary water resources?
A few perspectives are relevant here.
[75] The role of the U.S. Supreme Court creates a unique
institutional setting for negotiated settlement in the case of
river compacts. The Court is equipped with the equitable
apportionment doctrine for interstate water allocation and,
although not required to, may accept the role of final arbiter
if states cannot form a compact. Through this lens, water
compacts should approximate a fair solution; otherwise, a
state could be expected to cast its lot with the Court or
appeal to Congress for apportionment.
[76] The regression estimates without political variables
(specification 1) represent a positive analysis of relative
impact of equitable apportionment criteria on compact
allocations. The explanatory variables are limited to those
proposed in various legal venues as relevant factors for
developing equitable allocation. Results from either the OLS
or bootstrap regressions, as reported in Table 3, could pro-
vide a reference point for future compact negotiations or, in
the international realm, treaty negotiations. Study results
may be helpful in highlighting certain criteria that seem to
have received particular emphasis or, alternatively, that may
have been neglected in previous negotiations.
[77] An immediate application of this idea would involve
assessment of two river basins in the southeastern United
States, the Apalachicola‐Chattahoochee‐Flint river basin (a
transboundary river in Georgia, Alabama, and Florida) and
the Alabama‐Coosa‐Tallapoosa river basin (a transboundary
river in Georgia and Alabama). Compacts for both basins
were completed in 1997, yet they did not specify formulas
for water allocation among the states. The compacts sub-
sequently were terminated when the states failed to agree
upon allocation formulas [DuMars and Seeley, 2004; Sherk,
2005]. The compacts included provisions for protecting the
water quality, ecology, and biodiversity of the river systems.
Implementation of these provisions would require particular
attention in the context of a numerical formula from our
research, as the compacts that we studied, having been
signed between 1922 and 1979, do not include water ear-
marked for in‐stream environmental flows.
[78] The regression estimates with political variables
(specification 2) represent a positive perspective for
explaining compact water allocations that includes factors
other than those provided by legal theory or jurisprudence
(e.g., the influence of Congressional committee chair,
CommitteeChair). The OLS estimates provide a relatively
good fit to the data, with an R2 of 0.84. In the same vein,
both the OLS and bootstrap estimates provide a basis for
making reasonably accurate predictions of individual state
shares of the compacts. Interesting research questions,
which are limited by the small sample size, include whether
such patterns are consistent over time and whether and how
they might change with the recent inclusion of new allo-
cation criteria for ecological water needs and environmental
impact.
[79] With this context of goodness of fit serving as a
backdrop, we can also use the predicted shares to identify
“outlier” compacts, i.e., compacts with actual shares that
vary substantially from predicted shares (Table 4). The
Sabine River Compact and Yellowstone River Compact are
outliers among the two‐state compacts. Among the three‐
state compacts (the Bear River Compact and Republican
River Compact), actual and predicted shares vary substan-
tially for two states in each compact. Arizona and Colorado
within the five‐state Upper Colorado River Compact simi-
larly have actual and predicted shares that vary substantially.
These outliers both confirm that the compact allocation
process is not simply formulaic and raise a question about
the nature of the specific negotiation processes underlying
these compacts. This question could be the basis for future
research using case study methods.
[80] The main venue for further statistical analysis is
international transboundary water agreements. Given the
parallel between the criteria laid out in U.S. law and inter-
national law, are the current results transferable to interna-
tional agreements, and if not, how do they differ? Given the
propensity of parties to engage in issue linkage and side
payments as a means for reaching agreements in water
negotiations [e.g., Carraro et al., 2005; Dinar, 2009], do
parties receiving less than the share predicted by the
regression results receive other forms of compensation to
entice them to sign agreements? The answers to such
questions are left to future research.
Appendix A: Description of Data and Variables
A1. Dependent Variable
[81] AllocationSharesc is the share of river water allocated
by an interstate compact c to a state s, in fractional terms.
The units range from 0.01 to 0.99 and sum to 1 within a
compact. The allocation percentage is given directly in the
compact in some cases. In other cases, the percentage was
calculated on the basis of allocations of water quantities
contained in the compact. States that were signatories to a
compact but that did not receive water are not included in
the data set. Although over 20 compacts provide quantita-
tive allocations, several were not included in the data set
because of difficulty in accurately determining quantitative
allocations to the states.
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A2. Variables Describing a Compact
[82] Compact is the name of a river compact. Compactno
is an identifying number for each compact. State is the state
name.
A3. Independent Variables
[83] Each variable and how it was calculated is described
below. A list of the data sources is given in section A4. The
raw data for many of the explanatory variables are county‐
level data, for example, county‐level data on income or
population. The data are typically aggregated on a “basin‐
wide” basis within the state, not on an “entire state” basis.
That is, the data are summed over counties in the river’s
watershed in the state, not over all counties in the state.
Counties were included in the database if any part of the
county was within the basin of the river or water body
covered by the compact. County boundaries used in GIS
were 1980 county boundaries. In a small number of cases,
county boundaries changed between the period of compact
ratification and 1980. In such cases, various measures were
undertaken in order to best approximate the county bound-
aries at the time of ratification. Last, for the variables that
were constructed as shares, the share ranged from 0.01 to
0.99. The numerator was a value for a particular state, and
the denominator was a summed value over all states in the
compact, such that the shares for each such variable sum to
1 within a compact.
[84] LandSharesc is a state’s share of the aggregate area in
the compact’s river basin (data source 1).
[85] RelativePrecipsc is a measure of relative precipitation
per area (data sources 1 and 2.). The numerator is mean
annual precipitation (in inches) within each state basin area,
divided by per state basin area (in square meters). The
denominator is mean precipitation divided by area computed
on a basin level over all states in the compact. The variable
is constructed so as to remove the influence of land area in
the measurement of precipitation. The variable is greater
than 1 (or less than 1) if the basin within the state has a
higher (or lower) precipitation per unit area than the entire
compact basin. Average precipitation for a per state basin
area was calculated by multiplying average precipitation
data for each hydrologic unit (as defined by the USGS
hydrological boundaries data layer; see data source 1) in a
basin by the relative area of the hydrologic unit and then
taking the average for each state.
[86] NonCompactPrecipSharesc is the share of rainfall
volume in each state falling outside of the relevant river
basin (data sources 1 and 2). Volume per state was calcu-
lated by multiplying mean annual rainfall per hydrological
unit by each unit’s area for all hydrological units outside of
the compact basin in each state. Share was calculated by
dividing each state’s volume by the volume total for all
states in the compact.
[87] MeanTemperaturesc is the mean temperature for
counties within the river basin during the irrigation season,
April–September (data sources 1 and 3). The temperature
data are categorical data, with nine ordinal categories re-
presenting different temperature ranges. Means for each
county were calculated and then multiplied by county area,
then summed over the total number of basin counties for
each state, and then divided by total basin area in order to
derive a basin‐wide mean temperature. Mean temperature
data are available for the period 1971–2000. Although most
compacts were signed prior to this period, relative changes
in temperature were unlikely to have changed substantially
in the interim period.
[88] PopulationSharesc is the share of population in
counties within the basin (data sources 1 and 4). The
numerator is the population of counties within the compact
basin, summed over counties, to give population of the state
basin. The denominator is state basin population summed
over states in the compact. Population data are from the
decennial census closest to the year in which the compact
was signed.
[89] PopulationGrowthsc is the growth rate of population
in counties within the basin for the 20 year period covering
the decennial census in the decade before and after the
census closest to compact signing (data sources 1 and 4).
The sum of basin county population from the decennial
census occurring 10 years after the census used to calculate
the PopulationShare variable was divided by the figure for
the census 20 years prior on a per state basis.
[90] RelativeIncomesc is a relative measure of per capita
income in counties within the river basin (data sources 1 and
5). The numerator is per capita income in the state, com-
puted on a basin basis. The denominator is per capita
income over all states in the compact, computed on a basin
basis. The variable is constructed so as to remove the
influence of population in the measurement of income. The
variable is greater than 1 (or less than 1) if the basin within
the state has higher (or lower) per capita income than the
entire compact basin. Historical county‐level income data
are available only for the years 1959, 1969, and 1979. The
year closest to compact ratification was used. For compacts
ratified prior to 1959, 1959 income was used.
[91] PriorWaterSharesc is a measure of historical irrigation
water use for agriculture in counties prior to compact
signing (data sources 1 and 6.). Prior water use was calcu-
lated by multiplying total irrigated area (in acres) by mean
water application rate (in acre‐feet per acre) for each county.
The numerator is water use of counties within the compact
basin, summed over counties to give water use of the state
basin. The denominator is state basin water use summed
over states in the compact. For Caddo Lake Compact,
because of missing data, total irrigated area was multiplied
by average statewide water application rates.
[92] RiparianPositionsc ia a binary variable equal to 1 if
the state was the most upstream state in the compact and 0
otherwise.
[93] StatePopulationsc is the share of total state population
of basin states within a compact (data source 4). Data are
from the decennial census in the year closest to the year in
which the compact was ratified.
[94] CommitteeChairsc is a binary variable indicating
whether a state had a representative who chaired a Con-
gressional committee with jurisdiction over interstate river
compacts in the Congressional session during or prior to
compact signing (data source 7).
A4. Data Sources and Notes
[95] Note that all GIS data (area, state, county, and
watershed boundaries; precipitation; and temperature) were
analyzed using ArcGIS 9 software. Map areas used Albers
Equal Area Conic (USGS version) data projection.
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[96] The data sources mentioned in section A3 are
(1) areas and boundaries, (2) precipitation, (3) temperature,
(4) population, (5) income, (6) irrigation water use, and
(7) Congressional committee chair. Specific details are as
follows.
[97] 1. Area data layer sources are from U.S. Geological
Survey hydrologic units (watersheds), state boundaries, and
county boundaries (1980) map layers, all accessed from
http://nationalatlas.gov/on 5 May 2004.
[98] 2. Precipitation (rainfall) data are from the U.S.
Geological Survey, U.S. Department of the Interior. The
source is USGS average annual precipitation, 1961–1990
map layer, accessed at http://nationalatlas.gov/on 18 August
2009.
[99] 3. Temperature data are from NOAA’s NCDC, U.S.
Department of Commerce. Temperature map layers were
accessed at http://cdo.ncdc.noaa.gov/cgi‐bin/climaps/climaps.
pl?directive=order_details&subrnum=&region=Lower%
2048%20States&filename=temp0313 on 18 August 2009.
[100] 4. Population data are from the U.S. Census Bureau,
U.S. Department of Commerce, http://www.census.gov/
population/www/censusdata/cencounts/index.html, accessed
on 5 May 2004.
[101] 5. Income data are from two sources. Historical
county‐level income data are from http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/income/data/historical/county/index.html. State
income data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
U.S. Department of Commerce, http://www.bea.gov/regional/
spi/default.cfm?selTable=summary, accessed on 26 Septem-
ber 2005.
[102] 6. County‐level data on average irrigation applica-
tion rates and irrigated area are from reports of the U.S.
Census of Agriculture [U.S. Census Bureau, various years]
from the year closest to the year of compact ratification for
which data are available.
[103] 7. Data on relevant committee chairs in the U.S.
House of Representatives and U.S. Senate are from U.S.
House of Representatives [2002] and U.S. Senate [1989].
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